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ABSTRACT  
This article examines drug reformulation regulatory gaming as a vehicle for analyzing the way in which 
European courts and the Commission are currently approaching innovation issues in the pharmaceutical 
sector. First, the economics literature regarding pharmaceutical innovation is briefly summarized. Next, 
the phenomenon of regulatory gaming is introduced, followed by an analysis of the two primary theories 
of harm being used to address drug reformulations as a competition concern. In comparing the recent 
General Court decision in AstraZeneca to earlier U.S. court cases addressing similar conduct, it is 
asserted that these approaches differ in significant ways with regards to preservation of innovation 
incentives as well as on the basis of institutional and evidentiary concerns. Finally, this discussion is 
then placed into the broader context of the ongoing debate regarding pharmaceutical innovation that first 
surfaced in the Syfait cases—in particular, the desirability of sector-specific competition law analysis of 
pharmaceutical innovation.  
 
JEL: K21 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is a useful place to begin a study of the role of competition law in innovation for a 
number of reasons. Patricia Danzon has highlighted two particular characteristics of pharmaceutical markets 
which make them interesting from a law and economics standpoint. First, standard market analysis of 
pharmaceuticals ―must take into account its unusually high rate of R&D, which implies a high rate of technical 
change, critical importance of patent protection, potential for market power and novel price and product 
competitive strategies.‖1 Second, the industry is heavily regulated.2 Furthermore, unlike other industries that 
have been at the center of much of the innovation debate up to this point, certain factors that can greatly 
complicate the analysis are not present in pharmaceuticals. For example, there are not the same network effects 
as is the case with computer software. Not only may this clarify and simplify the analysis, but it also may 
provide a useful example to compare to Microsoft to assess the flexibility of the enforcement agencies in 
adapting their innovation policy to the particulars of the industry. Perhaps the most important reason, however, 
is that in recent years the rate of radical innovation, in the form of novel drug introduction, has been in decline 
in both Europe and the US.
3
 Because this trend has garnered significant attention from enforcement agencies, 
we are presented with a situation where the agencies are explicitly attempting to use competition law levers to 
promote innovation.  
Although these factors make pharmaceuticals a very interesting case study for questions related to 
innovation and the law, they also make that case a difficult one. In recognition of this, the sector has garnered 
increasing levels of attention in recent years—including major enforcement decisions4 and a sector inquiry, 
which was completed in July 2009.
5
 Each of these efforts demonstrates the Commission‘s commitment to 
developing a clearer understanding of the industry, and therefore also of the nature of the innovation that drives 
much of the competition in the industry. This article will focus on two of these endeavors to explore the debates 
that arose from them and to glean from them indications of the perceptions of the Commission and the courts 
with regards to pharmaceutical innovation.  
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Firstly, I briefly recount the standard narrative regarding the nature of the pharmaceutical industry and 
the economics of drug innovation (Part II). Then I will briefly summarize the Commission‘s approach to 
enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector (Part III). I will present the AstraZeneca
6
 case and the two primary 
approaches to regulatory gaming, and offer a critique on the basis of their probable impact on innovation (Part 
IV). I will then introduce the ongoing debate over the proper role for industry-specific characteristics in 
competition law enforcement, as well as discuss the ways in which the common story regarding the nature 
pharmaceutical innovation has come into question (Part V).  
 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 
 
The nature of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry has been the subject of extensive research. As one 
economist summarized, ―[t]he pharmaceutical industry is a textbook example of a science-based sector 
characterized by high R&D cost, uncertainty and spillovers, for which patent protection assures appropriability, 
thus providing incentives for innovation.‖7 ―To the extent that market power exists, it results largely from legal 
restrictions and other institutional factors‖ such as patents and the separation of decision makers from payers.8 
While there are two categories of supplier firms in the market, originators and generics, innovation almost 
exclusively comes from originator firms. Originator firms are ―research-based‖ and ―compete[] through 
innovation,‖ whereas generic firms ―compete through the traditional means of price and quality.‖9  
The structure of pharmaceutical R&D is in a process of transition and change. The level of basic 
research carried out by firms in-house has been declining,
10
 and originators increasingly enter the process at the 
development and testing phases.
11
 One possible reason why large originator firms have this advantage in the 
later stages of drug development is risk. Although the risk associated with any particular development effort is 
very high, the ability of large pharmaceutical firms to diversify across their portfolio of development projects 
brings the overall risk faced by originators down to average levels.
12
 Another contributing factor is that small 
research firms and biotechnology firms do not usually have the resources required to carry out the testing trials 
required for regulatory approval. Current estimates suggest that 25-40% of current sales by large originator 
firms are from products that originated in the biotech sector.
13
 
Pharmaceutical innovation is generally categorized as either radical or incremental.
14
 Radical 
innovations are generally taken to be a new molecular entity (NME).
15
 Incremental innovations, on the other 
hand, fall into one of two categories: (1) me-too drugs, and (2) reformulations. Follow-on drugs have been 
defined as ―a new entrant to a therapeutic class that had already been defined by a separate drug entity that was 
the first in the class to obtain regulatory approval for marketing.‖16 Thus, usually this involves a rival originator 
introducing a competing substitute product to the drug that was first in class. Furthermore, the characterization 
of follow-on‘s as incremental may be misleading since there is evidence to suggest that it is not intended to be 
incremental, but ends up incremental if that particular research effort doesn‘t reach the market first.17 Product 
reformulations, however, almost always involve an originator altering or improving its own product and 
introducing it as a new version of the original. It is commonly used as a strategy towards the end of a drug‘s 
patent life as a means of confronting generic competition. 
In terms of innovation as a policy matter, the focus has predominantly been on radical innovation 
because the originator market is believed to operate according to a blockbuster drug structure. In this model, 
originator pharmaceutical firms organize their R&D expenditures and efforts around the search for drugs with 
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the greatest revenue potential (based on potential patient population size and that population‘s ability to pay). 
This is borne out in econometric studies, which have observed that the distribution of sales revenue in the 
industry is highly skewed.
18
 In 2000, Grabowski & Vernon found that the top decile (in terms of profitability) of 
drugs accounted for 56% of overall sales revenue.
19
  
This skew can be explained as a result of the fact that the originator industry is characterized by fixed 
costs that are high relative to variable costs. ―A consequence of such a cost structure is that, in the short run, it 
will be profitable for the firm to sell output at prices that cover the lower incremental costs and yield some 
margin above those costs, but fall far short of total average unit costs.‖20 This results in many drugs being 
marketed ―despite very small peak revenues and quasi-profits that are a small fraction of mean R&D costs 
because if the uncertainties surrounding a compound‘s prospects are not resolved until clinical development is 
largely complete, most R&D costs are sunk.‖21 While it is universally understood that pharmaceutical R&D 
entails a high rate of failure,
22
 late stage failure is especially troublesome because drug testing trials (which is 
what happens during these later stages of development) are very expensive.
23
  
Recently, however, some have argued that this almost exclusive focus on radical innovation has 
overlooked and disregarded legitimate and meaningful incremental innovations. The incremental innovation 
associated with drug reformulations, although to a lesser extent than NMEs, requires the dedication of 
significant R&D resources. One study estimates that post-approval R&D expenditures constitute approximately 
25.8% of total R&D expenditures.
24
 Furthermore, there is evidence that these incremental innovations may 
provide significant benefits to consumers. Berndt, Cockburn, & Grepin (2006), in their study of drug utilization 
and supplemental indications, found that in two of the three drug classes they studied ―utilization in patients 
with diagnoses outside each drug‘s initially approved indication accounts for 70-80% of total use.‖25 They 
concluded that these results support the notion that incremental innovation seems to constitute an important 
metric of overall productivity.
26
  
Aside from their value as stand-alone innovation directly providing benefits to consumers, drug 
reformulations may also play a role in radical innovation. One possibility arises from the fact that the 
pharmaceutical industry is one in which knowledge spillovers between firms and from other research sources 
(government and universities) play an important role. The heavy reliance on patents aids this system by 
encouraging new knowledge disclosure in patent applications. Both failures and successes can be valuable 
spillovers.
27
 These spillovers can encourage innovation on two levels: (1) increase the likelihood of success of 
current research efforts by offering insights from other efforts and facilitating in-licensing of developments from 
other sources; and (2) incentivizing R&D expenditure by firms to enhance their ability to incorporate these 
spillovers, known as ―absorptive capacity‖.28 Absorptive capacity is thought to be essential to pharmaceutical 
R&D efforts because ―[a]lthough a public good, science is not a ‗free‘ good. Internal scientific capacities are 
critical for taking advantage of the public good.‖29 One recent study concluded that absorptive capacity is more 
important for generating radical innovations, than for other types of innovation.
30
 Thus, the R&D related with 
product reformulations may spillover into efforts to develop new novel drugs. 
The other avenue by which product reformulations may drive radical innovation is that the expectation 
of potential opportunity for further innovation to improve a product may provide incentives to engage in novel 
drug development. In other words, it is possible that anticipation of the possibility of improving a product, such 
as a drug, is an important source of incentives to develop new branded drugs in the first place.
31
 Others, 
however, criticize this suggestion, arguing that full recognition of incremental innovation weakens incentives to 
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generate radical innovations. ―Although generic competition drives out economic profits on brand-name 
products post patent expiration, rather than rest on their laurels, such competition forces brand-name 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to invest in new products and maintain a healthy pipeline of products under 
development.‖32 Although there are no definitive answers as to which of these ideas is more accurate, this 
debate exposes two very different perspectives on the consumer benefits associated with drug reformulations.
  
At first blush, generic-branded competition appears to be different than many of the other innovation 
cases we‘ve seen because generics and branded drugs are substitutes for one another, whereas the other cases 
predominantly involved complementary goods. But part of what makes this theory of harm so complex though 
is that the drug substitution laws functionally transform the relationship between generics and branded drugs 
into one with complementary goods characteristics. ―The generic manufacturer needs prescriptions for the 
branded product to take advantage of automatic substitution by the pharmacist…[t]he generic requires the brand 
to make automatic substitution sales.‖33 
The drug reformulation regulatory gaming cases discussed in Part III are the product of this 
disagreement over the value to consumers from these reformulations, combined with the fact that market power 
in pharmaceuticals arises largely from legal and institutional factors. Depending on the specific form of the 
reformulated drug, introduction of such drugs may harm generic competition in two ways: (1) delay entry of 
generics, and/or (2) impeding generic substitution for branded prescriptions. In the US, for example, the 
introduction of a product line extension ―delays generic substitution for the new branded product because the 
firm must file a second ANDA, which faces the same lengthy FDA review as the first one.‖34 Strategies to delay 
generic entry can be particularly important because of the significant role timing plays in the success of the 
product switch.
35
 Product switches are much more difficult, and therefore less likely to succeed, where ―generic 
versions of the old product have already entered the market before or simultaneously with the reformulated 
product.‖36 One possible cause for this are the differences in the nature of the pricing environment in these 
situations—if generics enter first, the price will have already dropped and therefore switching to a follow-on or 
reformulation would involve a price ―penalty‖ on the consumer.37  
 
III. THE COMMISSION‘S APPROACH TO PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
The past decade has seen a major shift in the approach taken by the Commission towards enforcement efforts in 
the pharmaceutical sector. The general trend has been away from predominantly intra-brand concerns and 
towards an emphasis on inter-brand issues. ―Traditionally, the Commission‘s anti-trust enforcement activity in 
the pharmaceutical sector has focused on removing private obstacles to parallel trade in pharmaceuticals within 
the Single Market.‖38 These intra-brand cases have been pursued under both Article 101 (concerted conduct), as 
we saw in the Glaxo Wellcome
39
 case involving the Spanish market, as well as Article 102, as was the case in 
Syfait, which involved GlaxoSmithKline in the Greek market.
40
  
In 2005 however, the AstraZeneca case (discussed more fully in Part III), signaled a major shift in the 
enforcement priorities of the Commission with respect to pharmaceuticals. This shift was explicitly driven, at 
least in part, by innovation concerns. According to then Commissioner Kroes, cases like AstraZeneca were 
aimed at the promotion of inter-brand competition ―in innovation for patented medicines between the 
pharmaceutical producers,…, and to encourage inter-brand competition from generic substitutes after patent 
expiry‖ thereby increasing price competition.41  Indeed, in its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report, the 
Commission asserted that its initiatives include ―creating a business environment that stimulates research, boosts 
valuable innovation and supports the competitiveness of the industry.‖42 Alongside this goal, however, the 
Commission acknowledged that drug prices and public budgets are also a major concern and ―are under 
significant constraints‖ so ―[c]ompetition, in particular competition provided by generic medicines, is 
essential…‖43  
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43 Id. at ¶11. 
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Although not expressly framed in this way, it seems implicit in this approach that the Commission 
views vigorous post-patent lapse competition from generics as also contributing to innovation incentives for 
originator producers. The rationale behind such a perspective would presumably be that generic competition 
drives down the rents reaped by originators on existing drugs, which motivates them to seek the monopoly rents 
possible with the development and introduction of novel drugs. This more nuanced and focused approach 
indicates that the Commission is intent on taking a more active approach in using competition law enforcement 
as a tool to stimulate innovation in pharmaceuticals. That being said, however, many questions remain as to the 
Commission‘s perspective on many specific innovation policy questions related to competition law 
enforcement. This paper hopes to highlight two in particular: (1) how to balance and/or prioritize the importance 
of incremental vs. radical innovation in a particular industry; and (2) the extent to which industry-specific 
characteristics should influence competition law rules and their application. 
 
IV. DRUG REFORMULATION REGULATORY GAMING 
 
As noted above, a distinctive characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry is that it is subject to extensive 
regulation. In addition to those aimed at protecting public health and safety, some regulations are intended to 
address market competition concerns—particularly the idiosyncrasies of demand for pharmaceutical drugs. For 
example, information asymmetries exist between patients and physicians, and between physicians and 
pharmaceutical firms, as to overall efficacy and the price-quality tradeoff of various drugs.
44
 This, combined 
with problems of agency and moral hazard arising from the fact that those responsible for selecting drugs are not 
the same entity paying for them, results in price being less responsive to quality.
45
 A problematic side-effect of 
imposing broad and wide-ranging regulation covering things like firm entry, product introduction and 
withdrawal, and using regulations to promote the use of generic drugs where possible, is that it creates 
opportunities for players to use those regulations to achieve ends unintended by regulators. This type of conduct 
has come to be known as ―regulatory gaming‖ and has been defined as ―private behavior that harnesses pro-
competitive or neutral regulations and uses them for exclusionary purposes.‖46 
 
Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that ―[t]he pharmaceutical industry presents a 
perfect storm for regulatory gaming.‖47 Indeed, regulatory gaming in the pharmaceutical context has taken many 
forms. One form in particular though has been receiving increasing attention in recent years in both the US and 
Europe—drug reformulations. These drugs are second-generation versions of successful branded drugs, and for 
this reason have also been called ―product line extenders‖ by the industry. Follow-on drugs commonly take the 
form of drug reformulations, different dosing protocols, and new delivery methods, sometimes resulting in new 
indications in which the drug can be used.
48
 Critics argue that this practice generally involves little, if any, true 
innovation and is primarily aimed at delaying generic entry or otherwise hampering the competitiveness of 
generic drug firms by closing off important means of distribution, which results in higher drug costs.
49
 Others, 
however, defend follow-on drugs as a legitimate form of incremental innovation because they increase the range 
of products available to consumers and can often offer significant benefits to some or all patients taking the 
drug.
50
  
A major reason why regulatory gaming has attracted so much attention of late is that some have drawn a 
link between the aforementioned decline in radical drug innovation rates and an uptick in the number of follow-
on drugs. Although innovation is usually viewed as the very essence of pro-competitive activity, there has been 
a judgment by some that these trends are bad for consumers. These concerns are two-fold. First, some have 
argued that follow-on drugs do not genuinely reflect true innovation and are merely used to disrupt effective 
generic competition. Others assert a more fundamental objection—arguing that even if these drugs are in some 
sense innovative, they do not contribute to consumer welfare enough to make up for the welfare lost as a result 
of foregone cost savings arising from reduced use of generic drugs. The notion that enforcement will ultimately 
benefit consumers, however, relies on the assumption that competition enforcers and courts are able to 
accurately distinguish between follow-on drugs that are pro-competitive and those that are merely used merely 
                                                        
44 Henry Grabowski, Competition Between Generic and Branded Drugs, in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, 
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46 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 34 at 687. 
47 Id. at 709. 
48 Berndt, supra note 25 at 71. 
49 See e.g., Sector Inquiry Report, supra note 3 at ¶1018 (quoting a European consumer association condemning these practices as 
―evergreening‖ and resulting in ―higher health care expenditures and/or higher prices for consumers‖); Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World 
Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009 (arguing that the combination 
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50 See Berndt et al., supra note 25 at 12. 
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as a mechanism by which to inhibit generic competition; or alternatively, to discern the extent to which the 
market functions properly, and where it does not, the direction and extent of the market error. The central 
importance of innovation to competition in pharmaceuticals, the nature of drug R&D, and the two-tiered 
competition structure involving originators and generics, however, makes assessment of the overall impact of 
these products very difficult.  
In an industry as heavily regulated and at the same time reliant upon innovation as pharmaceuticals, the 
question arises as to what impact, if any, enforcement actions against regulatory conduct, necessarily affects the 
incentives to invest the associated innovative efforts. Evaluating the impact of these enforcement efforts on 
innovation requires analyzing the nature and process of pharmaceutical innovation, as well as administrative and 
institutional concerns regarding the practical ability of agencies and courts to formulate rules that accurately 
distinguish between pro- and anti-competitive regulatory gaming and to consistently apply those rules. Up until 
now, this form of pharmaceutical regulatory gaming has largely been discussed as a homogeneous category of 
conduct.
51
 In this heading, we suggest that there are important differences amongst the cases alleging 
anticompetitive conduct involving follow-on drugs—differences which alter the error-cost mix associated with 
enforcement and, in turn, incentives for innovation. 
 
A. AstraZeneca v. Commission 
 
In a highly anticipated decision, in July 2010 the General Court of the European Union upheld a decision by the 
European Commission finding that AstraZeneca (AZ) had abused its dominant position in the market for its 
popular proton pump inhibitor (PPI), Losec, by withdrawing marketing authorizations in three member states.
52
  
In extremely brief summary, the facts giving rise to this claim of abuse are as follows. In anticipation 
of the expiration of patent protection for the active ingredient in Losec, omeprazole, AZ developed a multi-
prong strategy to address the impending impact of generic competition. As part of that strategy, AZ developed a 
new version known as omeprazole that would serve as the basis for a reformulated version of Losec—Losec 
MUPS. Losec MUPS was intended to be an intermediate product until AZ could introduce a new patented 
product—Nexium. Once Losec MUPS was completed and ready to be introduced to the market, AZ requested 
withdrawal of the market authorization for the original capsule form of Losec in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
in 1998.
53
 In May 1999, two generics producers filed a complaint alleging that AZ‘s conduct, namely removal 
of the market authorizations, prevented them from introducing generic versions of Losec in the European 
Economic Area markets.
54
  
The substance of the claim of abuse alleged that AZ manipulated pharmaceutical regulatory schemes 
through steps taken in the course of introducing a new tablet version of Losec, to replace the original capsule 
form. The regulation at issue in the case was Directive 65/65, which provided for an abbreviated procedure for 
granting marketing authorizations for generic drug products.
55
 At the time, in order for a generic company to use 
the abridged procedure, two requirements had to be satisfied: (1) the reference drug had been authorized in the 
Community for 6-10 years, and (2) the reference product must still have a valid market authorization in place at 
the time the generic manufacturer files an application for the abridged procedure.
56
 The Commission framed the 
abuse as follows: the request for deregistration of the marketing authorizations, in combination with AZ‘s 
withdrawal of the original form of Losec from the market and the launch of a reformulated version, Losec 
MUPS, blocked or delayed entry by generic producers and parallel importers, thereby harming competition.
57
  
In reviewing the Commission‘s decision, the General Court was careful to point out, however, that 
―although [the Commission] defined the abuse of a dominate position as the combination of those elements, the 
central feature of the abuse consists in the deregistration of the Losec capsule marketing authorizations,‖ the 
other elements of the abuse merely constituting the context in which the de-registrations were executed.
58
 Thus, 
introduction of the new product form and removal of the old form, alone, would not have constituted an abuse. 
It was the de-registrations that exceeded the scope of competition on the merits, since this is the ―sole element 
which could be capable of producing the anticompetitive effects alleged by the Commission,‖ namely erecting 
barriers to entry blocking generics and parallel importers.
59
 
AZ made several arguments in its challenge of the Commission‘s decision. First, AZ asserted that as 
the holder of the market authorization, it was legal for AZ to ―withdraw it as it pleases, or to let it expire, 
                                                        
51 See e.g., Jessie Chang, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2008); 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 34. 
52 AstraZeneca, supra note 6. 
53 Id. at ¶691. 
54 Id. at ¶3.  
55 Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 (Official Journal 022, 09/02/1965, p.0369/0373). 
56 AstraZeneca, supra note 6, at ¶617 and ¶666. 
57 Id. at ¶804. 
58 Id. at ¶807. 
59 Id. at ¶811. 
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without being obliged to provide a reason in this respect and without concerning itself with the effect of that 
decision.‖60 Second, AZ argued that even dominant firms are under no obligation to assist competitors and 
potential competitors by maintaining the market authorization for a drug product the firm is no longer interested 
in offering, particularly where such maintenance involves ongoing pharmacovigilence obligations.
61
 Third, AZ 
emphasized that generics were not entirely blocked from entering the market because of the availability of the 
published literature exemption as an alternative means of qualifying for the abridged procedure.
62
 Fourth, AZ 
argued that Losec MUPS was an objectively improved product over the capsule form of Losec, and therefore its 
introduction was pro-competitive and not exclusionary.
63
 Indeed, AZ acknowledged that the purpose of 
introducing Losec MUPS was to minimize the downward pressure on the price of Losec that would result from 
the entry of generic versions of omeprazole, but insisted that this does not constitute an abuse.
64
  
In upholding the Commission‘s theory of harm on this charge of abuse, the General Court rejected each 
of AZ‘s arguments in turn. According to the General Court, it was irrelevant that under Directive 65/65 it was 
legal for AZ to request withdrawal of the authorization because ―compliance or non-compliance with other legal 
rules‖ did not determine the scope of application of Article 82.65 The court also rejected AZ‘s proffered 
objective justification based on the pharmacovigilence requirements. The court noted that AZ was still required 
to comply with the requirements in the six other member states where AZ continued to offer the capsule form.
66
 
Moreover, because AZ had held the authorizations for five years, the risk of serious adverse reactions was low.
67
 
Further undermining this argument was the fact that AZ had not withdrawn its market authorizations in either 
Germany or the Netherlands, where the company had ceased the sale of Losec capsules, and yet AZ made no 
argument that the pharmacovigilence requirements were in some way applied in a more burdensome way in the 
countries where withdrawal was requested.
68
 With regards to AZ‘s argument that the availability of the 
published literature exemption meant that generics were not entirely blocked from the market and therefore the 
conduct could not be exclusionary, the court found this argument to fall short. ―[T]he fact that the regulatory 
framework offers an alternative route to obtaining a marketing authorisation does not remove the abusive nature 
of the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position where that conduct, considered objectively, has the sole 
object of making the abridged procedure…unavailable.‖69 Finally, the court dismissed AZ‘s emphasis on the 
fact that Losec MUPS was a better product than Losec or that the capsules were withdrawn because of consumer 
preferences, the court found this argument to miss the mark since the Commission was not asserting that the 
transition of sales from capsules to Losec MUPS itself created any barriers to entry, and therefore did not harm 
competition themselves.
70
 
In summary, according to the General Court, it is not an abuse for a firm to deploy a strategy ―whose 
object…is to minimize erosion of its sales and to enable it to deal with competition from generic products‖ so 
long as the strategy does not involve conduct that goes beyond competition on the merits.
71
 However, the court 
went on to state that ―an undertaking in a dominant position cannot use regulatory procedures solely in such a 
way as to prevent or make more difficult the entry of competitors on the market‖ absent some objective 
justification or otherwise related to the defense of some other legitimate consideration of a firm competing on 
the merits.
72
 
 
B. Impact on Innovation Incentives 
 
The theory of harm advanced in AstraZeneca is a subtle divergence from earlier U.S. cases addressing similar 
conduct,
73
 with potentially significant implications for pharmaceutical innovation. One common thread through 
all of these cases is that they do not allege that the introduction of a reformulated product itself inflicts the harm 
                                                        
60 Id. at ¶622. 
61 Id. at ¶635.  
62 Id. at ¶637. 
63 Id. at ¶700 and ¶715. AZ contended that Losec MUPS was better because omeprazole, the active ingredient in Losec, ―degrades rapidly 
and loses its efficacy if it is exposed to the acid conditions of the stomach.‖ Id. at ¶715. 
64 Id. at ¶739. 
65 Id. at ¶677. 
66 Id. at ¶658. 
67 Id. at ¶691. 
68 Id. at ¶659, 694. 
69 Id. at ¶829. 
70 Id. at ¶811. 
71 Id. at ¶804.  
72 Id. at ¶817. 
73 Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D.Del.2006) (holding that charges by Teva, a generic pharmaceutical 
producer, alleging regulatory manipulation were sufficient to support a monopolization claim against Abbott for conduct related to its drug 
TriCor); Walgreen Company v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, 534 F.Supp.2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing a monopolization claim by 
Walgreens that AstraZeneca ―deliberately switched the market‖ from its drug Prilosec to a reformulated version called Nexium, on the 
grounds that AstraZeneca did not remove the Prilosec from the market when it introduced Nexium and therefore there was no consumer 
coercion).  
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to competition. Instead, they assert that the harm results from the combining of the introduction of the new 
version of the drug with conduct to some degree ancillary to that introduction. The General Court in 
AstraZeneca dedicated the most effort to making this distinction clear when it stated numerous times that it was 
neither the introduction of the new formulation nor the removal of the old formulation that was the conduct at 
issue, but instead the combination of those two actions, coupled with the request for withdrawal of market 
registration.
74
 In the U.S. cases, the theory was that combining the introduction of a reformulated product with 
the withdrawal of the branded (not generic) original version could result in consumer coercion by interfering 
with drug substitution regulations. Therefore, in the U.S. cases, the courts draw the line at whether or not the 
prior version of the drug was removed from the market when the new version was introduced.
75
 In AstraZeneca, 
however, the ancillary conduct at issue is an action by the firm within the regulatory scheme that has 
implications for regulatory recognition of the original version. 
The connections between the approach taken in AstraZeneca and innovation policy issues are two-fold. 
First, the fact that the case was pursued as the first abuse of dominance case in pharmaceuticals, when viewed in 
combination with the Commission‘s publicly expressed concerns over reduced rates of novel drug 
introduction,
76
 suggests that the Commission views the two phenomena as being related.  The arguments made 
by the Commission in the case support this reading—that this type of regulatory gaming is particularly troubling 
when it is used as a means of avoiding competition in innovation with other originators. For example, in 
responding to AZ‘s contention that generic competition was ―parasitic‖, the Commission asserted that ―[t]he 
threat of the entry of generic products forces companies to innovate…‖77 The second way in which this case has 
implications for innovation policy is that, despite the fact that one of the primary motivations for bringing the 
case was to ensure sufficient pressure on originators to engage in novel drug innovation, the way that the theory 
of harm was framed minimizes the negative impact on incentives for legitimate, pro-competitive incremental 
innovation. It is much simpler to evaluate the effect on competition resulting from a specifically regulatory 
action that impacts generics directly because there is no need to make a definitive conclusion as to precisely 
what extent the market is functioning as it should. This is largely attributable to the fact that the approach of the 
General Court, as compared to the U.S. approach, relies upon more readily accessible evidence and avoids the 
very difficult process of attempting to measure the value of a particular innovation, and therefore is less likely to 
result in a false positive.  
According to the U.S. cases, where the original version of the product is removed, the conduct is 
assessed according to the rule of reason test articulated in Microsoft.
78
 The Microsoft court set forth a three-step 
test: the plaintiff must demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to 
proffer a pro-competitive justification for the conduct.
79
 If the plaintiff offers such a justification, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to either rebut the justification or establish that ―the anticompetitive harm for the 
conduct outweighs the pro-competitive benefit.‖80 Therefore, the court continued, if an anticompetitive harm is 
established, ―that harm will be weighed against any benefits presented by Defendants.‖81 Thus, cases which are 
not screened out by the second step of the analysis require a very complex balancing effort which demands very 
detailed information about the nature of how the market operates—information that is not generally susceptible 
to observation or definitive answer.  
By contrast, in the AstraZeneca framework courts and enforcement agencies are not faced with the task 
of deciphering whether the complexities of the pharmaceutical market leave sufficient room for meaningful 
consumer choice. In that sense, this approach might be thought of as ―pure‖ regulatory gaming since it really 
focuses in on specifically regulatory conduct (See Figure 4.1). Narrowing the scope of inquiry and isolating the 
regulatory action in this way simplifies the inquiry, which makes it less likely to lead to reduced incentives for 
legitimate innovation than the product substitution theory. There are two primary virtues to the approach in 
AstraZeneca from the standpoint of error costs. First, the anticompetitive harm alleged is both more severe and 
its boundaries better defined than that which was asserted in the U.S. cases. In AstraZeneca, withdrawal of the 
market authorizations prevented, or at least significantly delayed, generic entry and parallel imports, thereby 
eliminating the possibility for consumer choice in favor of generics. In the U.S. cases, on the other hand, where 
market entry by generics was not prevented (only entry as a direct generic substitute to the reformulated 
product), commentators have criticized the decision as making the ―true gravamen of… [the] allegations…not 
that consumer choice…was restricted but that an overt choice was required‖ (See Figure 4.2).82  
                                                        
74 AstraZeneca, supra note 6 at ¶646. 
75 Walgreens, supra note 73 at 151. 
76 Sector Inquiry Report, supra note 3 at ¶14. 
77 AstraZeneca, supra note 6 at ¶644. 
78 Abbott Labs, supra note 73 at 422. 
79 Id. at 422 citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001).  
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Guy V. Amoresano, Branded Drug Reformulation: The Next Brand vs. Generic Antitrust Battleground, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 249, 254 
(2007). 
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The second primary advantage of this approach is that the evidence required to assess whether or not 
the regulatory action by the firm was justified is more readily available and susceptible to consistent, accurate, 
and objective evaluation. This arises from the fact that the conduct being assessed is an interaction directly with 
a regulatory agency, and not an action that is generally considered to be a ―business judgment‖. The value of 
this approach is demonstrated by the way in which the court assessed AZ‘s (ultimately unsuccessful) argument 
that that the pharmacovigilence requirements
83
 associated with maintaining market authorizations were onerous 
and an objective driver of their decision to withdraw the authorizations in the countries they did. To assess the 
efficacy of this claim, the Commission and the General Court were able to look at AZ‘s own conduct—
particularly whether AZ‘s conduct with respect to the regulation was consistent across the markets in which it 
marketed the drugs at issue. Furthermore, the regulatory agency in charge of oversight for the regulation that 
was allegedly gamed has a special competence in gauging the burdens of a particular regulation because of its 
accumulated experience, both across firms and over time.  
 A primary problem with the U.S. approach of balancing the value of the specific innovation is that in 
many product switch scenarios, there will be some basis upon which to argue that the reformulated product is 
superior to the prior version of the drug,
84
 and therefore many product hopping cases will not be screened out by 
the second step, as was the case for many of the product designs at issue in Microsoft.
85
 As mentioned 
previously, these reformulated products often involve improved delivery methods and dosing protocols, and 
often the use of drugs for new indications. There is research to support the conclusion that these reformulations 
―can…generate substantial health benefits.‖86 These benefits may take the form of ―improved patient 
compliance, greater efficacy as a result of pharmacokinetics, reduced adverse effects or the ability to effectively 
treat new patient populations.
87
 Likewise, there may also be good reasons for withdrawing an older version of a 
product from the market when introducing a new one. ―It reduces consumer confusion and support costs and 
focuses retailers on the objective of promoting the new product, all of which can generate consumer benefits.‖88 
Finally, because of the procedural posture of the U.S. cases, we also have no clear picture of what this third step 
in the analysis would look like in the case of a legitimate product improvement.
89
  
Undermining the accurate weighing of these competing considerations is the fact that these cases 
require the balancing of the harm to generic competition, which is purely price competition, against the 
consumer benefit from the reformulated drug product—which is generally non-price competition. The likely or 
actual impact on drug prices is readily measurable, whereas the benefit from the innovative contribution of the 
reformulated drug are only partially observable or predictable at the time of product introduction and are almost 
impossible to quantify in the same manner. On the one hand, it may be possible to measure, or at least estimate, 
increased utilization of a reformulated drug, which is associated with health and economic benefits.
90
 Thus, one 
                                                        
83 Pharmacovigilence requirements generally impose ongoing reporting and updating requirements on drug manufacturers for any health or 
safety issues related to the drug that might become apparent over the drug‘s product life. See AstraZeneca, supra note 6 at ¶690.  
84 It is worth noting, however, that there is some ongoing debate as to what should be considered an ―objective improvement‖ in the context 
of pharmaceuticals. In Walgreens the plaintiffs argued that the reformulated version was in no way pharmacologically better in treating the 
relevant condition. Thus, the fact that drug quality is a multidimensional issue may also inform the analysis.  
85 In Microsoft, Microsoft did not offer justifications for many of the product designs at issue in that case and therefore the DC Circuit did 
not have to proceed to the third step of the analysis.  
86 Berndt et al., supra note 25 at 71.  
87 Id.  
88 Gilbert, supra note 33 at 71. 
89 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 34 at 716 (noting that the Abbott Labs opinion leaves open the issue of ―how a fact finder should go about 
balancing the precompetitive and anticompetitive effects of a change in formula‖). 
90 Berndt et al., supra note 25 at 73. 
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metric by which the net benefit of a reformulation can be measured is by the increase in consumer welfare when 
the drug reaches a broader patient population, facilitates increased compliance with dosing regimens, or 
otherwise improves a consumer‘s experience in taking the drug. These can be thought of as direct contributions 
to welfare. But this is not the only metric we must examine when assessing the benefits of these reformulations.  
As mentioned in Section II above, a significant level of knowledge spillovers characterizes the 
pharmaceutical industry.
91
  This means that the R&D from these reformulations may also benefit consumers 
indirectly by contributing to the effort to develop or improve other drugs. The impact of these spillovers are 
much more difficult to measure or estimate because they tend to be a long-run benefit, thus raising the 
possibility that they will be discounted in a competition analysis where the benefits are almost entirely realized 
in the short-term.
92
 Therefore objectively and accurately distinguishing between a pro-competitive withdrawal, 
which is meant to support the introduction of a new, innovative version of the drug, and an anti-competitive 
withdrawal meant only to impede generic substitution, is far more difficult. Because these problems tend to 
artificially tip the scales in favor of finding a violation, incentives for innovation are potentially negatively 
impacted.  
Even if we were to disregard the possibility of spillover effects, the introduction of a reformulation 
with only marginal benefits over a prior version cannot be assumed to be indicative of anticompetitive intent. 
Though certainly less risky an endeavor than developing a novel drug,
93
 it is not always possible to predict ex 
ante the benefits that will accrue to consumers from an effort to improve a drug. Nonetheless, it will still be 
rational for an originator to introduce the drug so long as profits exceed marginal cost (which is nominal for 
drug production), because most of the costs are sunk by the time a drug proceeds through testing.
94
 Furthermore, 
―[t]here are legitimate reasons for a manufacturer to stop selling and even recall older products. It reduces 
consumer confusion and support costs and focuses retailers on the objective of promoting the new product, all of 
which can generate consumer benefits.‖95 
Furthermore, measuring the impact on prices may not as simple as estimating what the price would 
have been if the reformulation had not entered the market. The Abbott Labs court, looking to Berkey Photo, 
concludes that deference to product designs and improvements is not warranted where consumer coercion is 
present.
96
 But there are good reasons to doubt that the consumer coercion discussed by the Berkey Photo court 
can be equated with what is being alleged in drug reformulation cases. Berkey Photo involved purely 
complementary products and so the coercion concern was that demand for one product drives demand for 
another product, and therefore consumers who wish to have the one product are limited in their choice for the 
second product. The nature of coercion the Abbott Labs court impliedly equates to this is different. As 
mentioned in Section III, generics can be thought of as a substitute product with characteristics of a 
complementary product due to the imposition of drug substitution rules. As confirmed in Walgreens, the notion 
is that consumer choice is limited by the originator removing the old version from the market. But in both 
Abbott Labs and Walgreens, the older version was still available in generic form on the market. And in at least 
one very important respect, generics and branded drugs are much more like substitutes than complements—
selection of drugs is still driven by quality and cost considerations, and not by possible interoperability concerns 
as may be the case with true complements. ―At bottom, it appears that the true gravamen of Teva‘s allegations 
in Abbott Labs was not that consumer choice (through the prescribing physician) was restricted but that an overt 
choice was required.‖97 Therefore, to the extent that markets may not efficiently choose between the branded 
reformulation and the generic version of the original, it is likely mostly due to information asymmetries and 
agency problems as opposed to coercion, in the traditional sense. Even if the concept of coercion is expanded to 
encompass this effect, the degree of the anticompetitive effect would be less than the more direct form of 
coercion, but given the vagueness of the notion it is difficult to estimate how much less. Without a clear notion 
of the impact of this broadened sense of coercion we do not really know how heavy the anticompetitive effect 
side of the scale is. 
Some have argued that balancing tests in general are inappropriate for antitrust analyses of innovation. 
In a recent article, Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright argued that antitrust enforcement actions in the context 
of innovation generally ―create[] a special opportunity for antitrust error.‖98 Their rationale is that false positives 
are more costly than false negatives because in the former, ―successfully challenging…product innovations is 
likely to dampen innovation across the economy, whereas Type 2 errors are at least mitigated in part by entry 
and other competition.‖99 Others have argued that the stakes associated with error in an innovation case are 
                                                        
91 See e.g., Magazzini et al., supra note 7; Sternitzke, supra note 14.  
92 Gilbert, supra note 33 at 72. 
93 Comanor, supra note 23 at 64. 
94 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
95 Gilbert, supra note 33 at 71. 
96 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
97 Amoresano, supra note 82 at 254. 
98 Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 164 (2010). 
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―much higher‖ because ―most innovation is beneficial‖.100 Richard Gilbert, in his analysis of the various 
potential tests a court could use to identify so-called ―predatory innovation‖, concluded that ―all of [the] tests are 
likely to produce false positives that chill incentives for beneficial investments in research and development.‖101 
Manne & Wright have even suggested that there is a bias against innovative products and practices because 
―courts and economists‘ initial understanding of these practices‖ is usually limited, which skews attitudes in 
favor of enforcement.
102
 
These critiques make the U.S. product substitution theory of harm particularly problematic. Attempts to 
objectively administer a balancing test to determine the legality of a product withdrawal are prone to erring on 
the side of finding a violation and therefore condemning what may be a procompetitive innovation.  Whereas 
the costs and benefits of a decision to take a particular regulatory step are usually readily estimable, product 
introduction and withdrawal is generally a business judgment. Therefore objectively and accurately 
distinguishing between a ―pro-competitive‖ withdrawal, which is meant to support the introduction of a new, 
innovative version of the drug, and an ―anti-competitive‖ withdrawal meant only to impede generic substitution, 
is far more difficult.   
 The risk that a balancing test in this context could result in false positives condemning procompetitive 
reformulations and conduct related to those reformulations, may negatively impact incentives for both 
incremental and radical innovations. The impact on this form of incremental innovation would be direct. If drug 
reformulations must now not only be simply ―improved‖, but improved to a particular degree above the original 
version to avoid antitrust scrutiny, the risk profile of these efforts rises. This may also discourage this type of 
innovative effort by increasing the costs of developing and introducing such a reformulation. To assess the risk 
of antitrust enforcement action, firms may find it necessary to begin doing side-by-side testing with the original 
version to ensure a sufficient amount of objective improvement. This would raise the costs of engaging in 
product improvement. 
An obvious counterargument to this is that according to the courts in Abbott Labs and Walgreens, these 
reformulations could be introduced without giving rise to an antitrust claim, so long as the previous version 
remains in the market. But it is precisely in these marginal cases that the rationale for removing prior versions 
from the market may be strongest. Where the immediate benefits from the improvements are more modest, and 
therefore the prices able to be charged are likewise modest, a firm may not be able to justify the effort and 
resources associated with supporting two products in the marketplace. Of course, in these same circumstances, a 
firm may likewise be more tempted to withdraw the old version for the sake of the benefits it may reap as a 
result of closing off the opportunity for generics to benefit from drug substitution mechanisms. Thus, we are left 
with conduct that is as readily explainable as pro-competitive as it is as anti-competitive, with no clear and 
reliable means for a court to choose between the alternate explanations.  
Furthermore, it is possible that the opportunity for incremental innovation down the road contributes to 
the incentives to create novel drugs in the first place. This is the notion that when a firm, pharmaceutical or 
otherwise, invests resources in developing a product and introducing it to the market, there is an assumption that 
the firm would retain the opportunity to change and improve that product.
103
 
Another way to differentiate these two theories of harm is according to the contexts in which they may 
be used. The success of a product switch depends heavily upon the second-generation drug being brought to 
market before a generic version of the first product has been introduced.
104
 The Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 
Report by the European Directorate General of Competition identified several strategies sometimes used by 
originator firms to bridge this potential time gap between introduction of a second-generation product and 
generic entry. Those strategies include strategic marketing efforts for both products, litigation against generics 
with respect to the first product, withdrawal of marketing authorizations for the first product, intervention at 
various regulatory bodies, and settlements with generic companies.
105
 Unlike these strategies, however, 
withdrawal of the first product is not a bridging strategy because it requires that the second-generation product 
be ready to be introduced to the market.
106
 
Secondly, the evidence required to assess whether or not the regulatory action by the firm was justified 
is more readily available and susceptible to consistent, accurate, and objective evaluation. Unlike the product 
substitution theory where the impact of the action by the originator is filtered through the market, in pure 
regulatory gaming cases, the action at issue is ancillary to the product switch and therefore can be evaluated on 
its own. 
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AZ unsuccessfully attempted to make such an argument. AZ asserted that the pharmacovigilence 
requirements associated with maintaining market authorizations were onerous and an objective driver of their 
decision to withdraw the authorizations in the countries they did. To assess the efficacy of this claim, the 
Commission and the General Court were able to look at AZ‘s own conduct—particularly whether AZ‘s conduct 
with respect to the regulation was consistent across the markets in which it marketed the drugs at issue. 
Furthermore, the regulatory agency in charge of oversight for the regulation that was allegedly gamed will have 
a special competence in gauging the burdens of a particular regulation because of its accumulated experience, 
both across firms and over time. AstraZeneca demonstrated this because the drug agency was able to contribute 
evidence that supported the notion that the burden pharmacovigilence requirements and the likelihood of a 
serious problem arising tended to decline significantly over time.  
The objective justification test also sufficiently protects innovation incentives. If such an objective 
justification cannot be thoroughly established, then not only is the action presumptively anticompetitive, but it is 
also unlikely to affect the firm‘s decisions regarding developing improvements to existing drugs. Presumably, if 
a legal or functional connection could be established between a regulatory action and a pro-competitive, non-
sham reformulation, that would constitute an objective justification. 
 
C. Implications for Innovation Policy 
 
Ultimately, despite the limited European case law on this form of regulatory gaming, AstraZeneca does offer 
some insights into the contours of the innovation-related thinking in the pharmaceutical sector. There seems to 
be an implicit presumption that radical innovation is significantly more important to overall competitiveness in 
the industry than is incremental innovation. By the same token, generic competition is viewed as being an 
essential source of pressure to drive originators back to competition in innovation post-patent lapse. Thus, while 
AstraZeneca constitutes a measured approach by refraining from broadly condemning product reformulations, 
the case suggests that actions which interfere with the standard model of upfront patent protection for novel 
medicines followed by vigorous competition by generics post-patent lapse to drive prices down, will be viewed 
with a healthy dose of skepticism.  
 
V. THE SYFAIT CASES: THE DEBATE REGARDING INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION, 
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS & COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS 
 
A pair of relatively recent opinions, arising out of a conflict between GlaxoSmithKline and distributors in 
Greece who also engaged in parallel trading, brought the debate over two issues central to pharmaceutical 
innovation and competition law to the forefront.
107
 The first is really a question that goes directly to the heart of 
the debate over pharmaceutical innovation policy—what is the relationship, if any, between parallel trading, 
firm revenues, and incentives to invest in research and development? The second issue over which these 
opinions clashed is a much broader question for competition law as a whole: what role should industry-specific 
characteristics have on the applicability of competition law rules? These opinions express vastly different 
perspectives on both questions, and this serves both to elucidate some of the points that an innovation policy 
must address, as well as to demonstrate that vast disagreement on many of those points is possible, and perhaps 
even likely.   
 
A. Industry-Specific Characteristics 
 
Up to this point, this paper has emphasized many unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry and the 
process of drug innovation. It is important to note, however, that the question of what role industry-specific 
characteristics should play in competition law analysis remains a matter of intense debate. The controversy is 
two-pronged. First, should unique industry contexts impact what conduct is considered abusive and/or should 
such characteristics constitute a legitimate source of for justification for certain types of allegedly abusive 
conduct? If this first question is answered in the affirmative, the second question is what is the burden faced by 
the parties for establishing that such characteristics exist and the nature of their effect on competition in the 
market? This issue has significant implications for innovation policy implementation through competition law 
because it defines the boundaries as to the extent to which competition rules can be tailored to suit the 
particularities of a given industry.  
 The Syfait cases involved attempts by GlaxoSmithKline to stem the tide of parallel trading in its 
pharmaceutical products out of Greece. In 2000, GSK stopped meeting the orders of Greek wholesalers who 
engaged in parallel trading of the drug products to other Member States, instead supplying hospitals and 
pharmacies directly. In 2001, GSK recommenced distribution to wholesalers, but limited the supplies distributed 
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to wholesalers to just above national market demand. Wholesalers claimed that these actions constituted an 
unjustifiable refusal to deal and therefore constituted an abuse of dominant position under Art.82 EC (now 
Art.102 TFEU). In the case, the Greek competition authority (the EA) identified a number of factors based on 
unique aspects of the pharmaceutical industry that it believed might impact whether or not the conduct at issue 
was objectively justified and made inquiry with the CFI as to whether they could play a role in justifying the 
conduct. The Commission argued that refusals to supply by a dominant firm could only be justified in a narrow 
set of circumstances and that none of the factors identified by the Greek competition authority were relevant 
considerations for justifying a refusal to deal.  
 While both the CFI and ECJ opinions acknowledge that in certain circumstances the features of a 
market rise to the level of creating a distinctive context that should be taken into account in assessing whether 
certain conduct can be justified, the opinions diverged considerably in their assessment of whether the 
pharmaceutical sector constitutes such an altered environment. In the CFI opinion, Advocate General Jacobs 
held that a refusal to supply ―is capable of objective justification, and thus of not constituting an abuse, where 
the price differential giving rise to the parallel trade is the result of State intervention in the Member State of 
export…, given the combined circumstances of the European pharmaceutical sector at the current stage of its 
development…‖108 AG Jacobs went on to identify four factors in particular that make the pharmaceutical sector 
unique and are therefore relevant to determining whether a refusal to supply is justified: (1) the ―pervasive and 
diverse State intervention in the pricing of pharmaceuticals‖; (2) the regulation by the Community and the 
Member States of the distribution of pharmaceutical products establishing nationally demarcated obligations 
upon pharmaceutical firms; (3) the ―potentially negative consequences of parallel trade for competition…and 
incentives to innovate‖; (4) the fact that the end consumers of pharmaceutical products cannot be assumed to 
benefit from parallel trade.
109
 What this holding clearly indicates is a willingness on the part of AG Jacobs to 
tailor a competition law analysis in a way that is ―highly specific to the pharmaceutical industry in its current 
condition.‖110 
 In Syfait II, however, AG Colomer took a very different view of the nature of the pharmaceutical 
industry in holding that GSK could not justify its policies against parallel trade. According to AG Colomer, the 
control and regulation of drug product prices by Member States ―does not entirely remove the prices of those 
products from the law of supply and demand‖111 and therefore Art.82 cannot be applied differently in the 
pharmaceutical sector on that basis.
112
 Although AG Colomer ultimately rejected all of the justifications 
proffered by GSK, he ultimately left the door open for justification analysis to take some account of the unique 
nature of price regulation in pharmaceuticals. Though he did not offer much in the way of specific guidance on 
how the analysis would work, he did note that ―it cannot be ignored that…State intervention is one of the factors 
liable to create opportunities for parallel trade.‖113 
 
B. Relationship Between Parallel Trading and Innovation Incentives 
 
Among the factors he found to be particularly relevant to the analysis of whether GSK‘s conduct was justified, 
AG Jacobs found it ―relevant to consider some of the economic factors affecting the commercial policy of 
pharmaceutical undertakings.‖114 Because production in pharmaceuticals is characterized by high fixed costs 
and relatively low variable costs, by the time a drug reaches the market, most of the costs are sunk and it is 
therefore rational for a drug company to bring a drug to market so long as the price is above variable cost. 
Therefore, ―[t]he mere fact that a product is marketed on a given market at a given price does not mean that a 
pharmaceuticals undertaking could recoup its total costs if that price were generalized across the whole of the 
Community.‖115  
According to AG Jacobs, this cost structure, together with the fact that pharmaceutical price and 
distribution are regulated in a nationally segregated manner, and that parallel trading, by definition, undermines 
national price differentials, suggests that parallel trading threatens to undermine incentives for pharmaceutical 
firms to invest in research and development.
116
 In other words, the fact that drug prices are regulated along 
national market lines allows firms to market drugs even in markets where the low prices established would not 
otherwise cover total costs, but parallel trading destabilizes this system by undermining the firm‘s ability to 
make up in high price markets what is not covered by sales in low price markets. If a firm is unable to cover its 
total costs, it is unlikely to invest in developing the drugs in the first place. Therefore, according to AG Jacobs, a 
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pharmaceutical firm may be justified in making certain efforts to stem parallel trading. AG Colomer, however, 
entirely dismissed the argument that parallel trading may negatively affect incentives for research & 
development, stating that ―no causal link between the repercussions of parallel trade on the revenues of 
pharmaceutical companies and those companies‘ investments in research and development‖ had been 
established.
117
  
Thus, while there seems to be some agreement on the principle that industry-specific characteristics 
may have a role to play in competition law analysis in certain circumstances, the fact that these two opinions 
articulate almost entirely contradictory perspectives on the pharmaceutical industry highlights one of the major 
obstacles to effectively incorporating industry-specific insights into legal rules and analysis. Economics does not 
always offer clear answers to what drives innovation.  
Furthermore, at least in the pharmaceutical sector, the structure and process of R&D along with our 
understanding of it, is evolving in ways that may undermine the applicability of the standard narrative regarding 
what drives drug innovation that was laid out under 2.1. above. Indeed, in recent years there has been a trend 
towards disintegration in pharmaceutical R&D.
118
 An increasing number of innovations are originating outside 
of the major pharmaceutical firms, instead coming from smaller firms (especially biopharmaceutical outfits), 
with ―the major drug companies only entering the process at the development and testing phases.‖119 Another 
poignant example of this is the argument made by Boldrin & Levine in their book Against Intellectual 
Monopoly, questioning the almost universal assumption
120
 that pharmaceutical innovation, more than innovation 
in almost any other industry, depends heavily upon strong patent protection.
121
 Thus, the fact that many of these 
issues remain in flux and a matter of sharp debate complicate their incorporation into a coherent, consistent 
approach to competition law analysis. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Although this study is in no way exhaustive, it does provide some insights as to how the Commission and 
European courts are approaching innovation in this industry. First, the Syfait cases suggest that while industry-
specific characteristics may have a role to play in narrow circumstances, the burden of justifying conduct on the 
basis of protecting incentives to invest in innovation will be high. Furthermore, there is vast disagreement over 
what drives investments in pharmaceutical R&D and the extent to which state intervention alters the competitive 
environment in the market. The limited context of regulatory gaming also contributes to our understanding of 
now prevailing pharmaceutical innovation policy in competition law. The Commission and General Court 
decision in AstraZeneca suggest a skepticism regarding the impact of incremental innovation in the form of 
reformulated drugs on consumer welfare. The very fact that the case was brought may reflect a judgment by the 
Commission that radical innovation is far more important to competition in the pharmaceutical sector and a 
concern that incremental innovation will draw resources away from novel drug development. Given that the 
Final Pharmaceutical Sector Report was released only just over a year ago, the prospect of increasing levels of 
enforcement in this industry, and the evolution of the structure of pharmaceutical R&D, we should expect 
ongoing development of these perspectives in coming years.  
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